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An Era of Rapid Change: The Abdication of Cash & the 
FTC’s Unfairness Authority 
Elie Freedman* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a complaint 
against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (“Wyndham”), a holding company for a 
group of hotels, claiming that on three separate occasions between 2008 and 2010, 
Wyndham’s failure to maintain reasonable network security measures had resulted 
in third-party security breaches.1 The FTC alleged that Wyndham’s security 
failures resulted in $10.6 million in fraud loss, and the theft of more than 200,000 
Wyndham customers’ personally identifiable account and credit card information.2 
While it has yet to go to trial, FTC v. Wyndham3 is perhaps “the most important 
case in privacy and data security law,”4 because it promises to shape the FTC’s 
authority to regulate third-party data breaches through the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, codified in 15 U.S.C. § 45 (hereinafter referred to 
interchangeably as either the “FTCA” or “Act”), and consequently, information 
security and consumer privacy.5 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2015; B.A., History, McGill 
University, 2008. I would like to thank my parents, Marilyn and Norman, and my brother, Shane, for 
their unwavering love and support. I also thank Professor James Flannery for his invaluable guidance, 
mentorship, and encouragement. Last, but not least, thank you to all of the editors from the University of 
Pittsburgh Journal of Technology, Law & Policy for your contributions to this article. I could not have 
done it without you. For comments or to request sources, I may be reached at 
Elie.Freedman@gmail.com. 
1 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 2, FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 3281910 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012) [hereinafter 
Wyndham First Amended Complaint]. 
2 Id. 
3 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR, 2013 WL 1222491 (D. Ariz. 
Mar. 25, 2013) (transferring the case to the district court for the District of New Jersey). 
4 Katie W. Johnson, Impending Wyndham Ruling Leaves Some Questioning FTC’s Enforcement 
Power, BLOOMBERG BNA PRIVACY & SEC. LAW REPORT (Sept. 2, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X97AK2UO000000. 
5 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012); see Peter S. Frechette, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction over 
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The FTC has been extremely active in regulating third-party data breaches, 
but its success in data-security enforcement, thus far, is due exclusively to 
organizational compliance with FTC consent orders.6 Wyndham’s importance 
comes from the fact that because it is likely to go to trial, Wyndham will likely 
produce the first judicial opinion on FTC regulation in the data-security breach 
realm.7 While the FTC has normally required that a private company must provide 
“reasonable and appropriate security for . . . personal information collected and 
maintained,”8 the Wyndham case may significantly broaden, or restrict, the scope of 
this standard. Wyndham’s legal conclusions are poised to send shockwaves through 
the business world, as to whether the FTC may regulate what measures are 
“reasonable and appropriate.”9 In Wyndham’s wake are the concerns of the average 
consumer: after a business has electronically collected and stored personal 
consumer information, how far must it go to protect it? This question begs an 
answer that the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey is bound 
to address. 
Wyndham’s potential impact on the business world and consumers is 
eminently apparent; the result may also affect the practice of law by necessitating 
new advisement strategies for lawyers working both in-house and as outside 
counsel for technology companies focused on utilizing personally identifiable 
consumer information.10 Advances in computer technology and information storing 
practices, across industries, have resulted in a significant increase in data security 
breaches.11 Data security breaches categorically refer to “an organization’s 
unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss of sensitive personal 
information,” including personally identifiable information such as Social Security 
numbers, or financial information such as credit cards and bank account numbers.12 
                                                          
6 See infra Part II.C. 
7 See Johnson, supra note 4. 
8 First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief ¶ 24, FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 3281910 (D. Ariz. Aug. 9, 2012). 
9 See Johnson, supra note 4. 
10 See David McAuley, FTC in Cyberspace: Ready, or Not, for Coming Wave of Connected 
Devices, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 20, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bna.com/ftc-cyberspace-ready-
n17179880248/. 
11 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-487T, INFORMATION SECURITY: FEDERAL 
AGENCIES NEED TO ENHANCE RESPONSES TO DATA BREACHES 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-487T?source=ra. 
12 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT 
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The theft of personally identifiable information and credit card or bank account 
numbers is more than likely to cause consumer injury, and preventing such injury is 
a natural objective of the FTC. The abdication of “cash as king” has resulted from 
the increased use of electronic payment methods by consumers in commercial 
transactions. Electronic payment methods require the use of personally identifiable 
consumer information to verify and accept payments. Concomitantly, the 
technology industry has rapidly developed new and enticing uses for consumer 
information in business strategies.
13
 Consequently, cognizance about the 
applicability of these developments to clients, and their businesses implies that the 
legal community should anticipate and recognize its role to provide responsible and 
sound advice for implementing these strategies reasonably and appropriately. 
Nowhere is this development more pertinent than in the city of Pittsburgh, 
which is home to over 1600 technology companies14 and the incubator for close to 
fifty new technology businesses per year.15 For lawyers in Pittsburgh, especially 
those working with new and developing companies, data security law promises 
significant added value for clients. More importantly, this practice area requires 
attention because of its possible impact on both newly retained and long-standing 
in-house legal counsel’s obligations and due diligence practices.16 Furthermore, 
reasonable and appropriate security measures may also become important 
considerations for lawyers assisting with start-up entity formation and capital 
investment attraction. FTC suits may result in significant civil liabilities (and 
consequent monetary penalties), and therefore investors may be deterred from 
capital contributions to companies without reasonable security measures in place. 
In light of recent security breaches exposing consumer information at Target, 
Neiman Marcus, and Kickstarter,17 to name only a few, Wyndham demands the 
attention of practitioners. As data security law develops, legal counsel will be 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Jason Morris & Ed Lavandera, Why Big Companies Buy, Sell Your Data, CNN TECH 
(Aug. 23, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/23/tech/web/big-data-acxiom/. 
14 Dan Bobkof, From Steel To Tech, Pittsburgh Transforms Itself, NPR (Dec. 16, 2010, 6:57 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/16/131907405/from-steel-to-tech-pittsburgh-transforms-itself. 
15 Company Creation, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., https://www.cmu.edu/cttec/Spin-Outs/ 
index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). 
16 Id. at 51. 
17 Paula Rosenblum, In Wake of Target Breach, Cash Becoming King Again, FORBES (Mar. 17, 
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required to advise and guide their clients to setup and maintain reasonable and 
appropriate data security measures for both existing and new ventures.18 
General consumer ignorance and widespread industry confusion regarding the 
FTC’s unfairness authority belies the import of the Wyndham decision. The impact 
of the FTC’s enforcement of the FTCA in the data-security realm, when coupled 
with a dramatic rise in the severity and frequency of data-breaching attacks against 
U.S. businesses compels a cogent and fresh examination of the FTC’s unfairness 
authority. This Article has several aims: (1) to provide legal professionals, students, 
and business operators an understanding of the history of the FTC’s unfairness 
authority; (2) to examine important examples of the FTC’s enforcement of the 
unfairness authority through consent orders, in order to provide the factors, and 
data security measures that the FTC considers reasonable and appropriate for 
collecting personally identifiable consumer information; (3) to examine the 
arguments challenging the FTC’s unfairness authority posited in Wyndham, and 
evaluate their strengths; and, (4) most fundamentally, to dispel inapposite and 
rudimentary characterizations of the FTC’s unfairness authority enforcement as 
irrational, inconsistent or illegitimate. Part I of this Article reviews the FTCA’s 
statutory framework. Part II investigates the current case law and administrative 
actions that have shaped the FTC’s unfairness authority. Part III thoroughly 
discusses and analyzes the Wyndham case, each of the party’s arguments in their 
respective pretrial motions, and the court’s recent opinion denying Wyndham’s 
motion to dismiss. 
I. THE FTCA STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
The FTCA provides the jurisdictional basis for FTC action over “unlawful” 
practices.19 The FTCA explicitly states that the FTC, “is hereby empowered and 
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”20 In defining an unfair or deceptive labor 
practice the FTCA further provides that: 
The Commission shall have no authority under this 
section . . . to declare unlawful an act or practice on the 
                                                          
18 Michelle Sherman, Advising Clients on Internet Privacy Policies, 29 GPSOLO, no. 6, 2012 at 
48, 49, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2012/november_december2012 
privacyandconfidentiality/advising_clients_internet_privacy_policies.html. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012). 
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grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act 
or practice causes or is likely to cause [1] substantial 
injury to consumers which is [2] not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition. In determining whether an act or practice 
is unfair, the Commission may consider established 
public policies as evidence to be considered with all 
other evidence. Such public policy considerations may 
not serve as a primary basis for such determination.21 
Thus, the statutory structure provides two separate bases by which the FTC can 
claim authority: the FTC may regulate unlawful conduct, categorically, as a 
deceptive or unfair practice.22 At issue in Wyndham is whether the FTC has the 
jurisdiction to regulate data security breaches via the unfairness basis.23 In addition 
to the enforcement jurisdiction contained in § 45, § 57(a)(1)(A) of the Act provides 
that the FTC may prescribe “interpretive rules and general statements of policy 
with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce within 
the meaning of section 45(a)(1) of [title 15],” subject to the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.24 Following this 
grant of authority, the FTC gives substance to the statutory framework. 
                                                          
21 Id. § 45(n). 
22 Id. § 45(a)(2). 
23 Id. § 45(a)(2); see also FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR, 2013 
WL 1222491 (D. Ariz. Mar. 25, 2013). 
24 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(1)(b), also describes the unfair or deceptive acts or practices rulemaking 
proceedings offering: 
When prescribing a rule under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section, the 
Commission shall proceed in accordance with section 553 of Title 5 (without 
regard to any reference in such section to sections 556 and 557 of such title), 
and shall also (A) publish a notice of proposed rulemaking stating with 
particularity the text of the rule, including any alternatives, which the 
Commission proposes to promulgate, and the reason for the proposed rule; 
(B) allow interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments, 
and make all such submissions publicly available; (C) provide an opportunity 
for an informal hearing in accordance with subsection (c) of this section; and 
(D) promulgate, if appropriate, a final rule based on the matter in the 
rulemaking record (as defined in subsection (e)(1)(B) of this section), 
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II. MOLDING THE LIMITS OF “UNFAIR” AND THE FTC’S AUTHORITY 
The first substantial test of the FTC’s authority to prohibit unfair business 
practices occurred in 1972, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., holding that consumers and competitors alike 
should be protected from unfair practices.25 
In 1968 the FTC issued a cease and desist order to the Sperry & Hutchinson 
Company (“S&H”), alleging a violation of § 45(a)(1).26 Specifically, the FTC 
claimed that S&H was engaged in unfair practices by improperly regulating trading 
stamp rates; attempting to suppress other trading stamp exchanges; and colluding 
with other companies to regulate the rate of stamp dispensation.27 S&H argued that 
§ 45(a)(1) permitted the FTC to “restrain only such practices as are either in 
violation of the antitrust laws, deceptive, or repugnant to public morals,” and that 
since S&H engaged in no such activity, the FTC lacked authority in the matter.28 In 
promulgating its opinion, the Court considered whether 
[15 U.S.C. § 145(a)(1)] empower[s] the Commission to 
define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even 
though the practice does not infringe either the letter or 
the spirit of the antitrust laws? Second, does [15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(1)] . . . empower the Commission to proscribe 
practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect upon 
consumers regardless of their nature or quality as 
competitive practices or their effect on competition?29 
The Supreme Court held that the statute empowered the FTC to define and 
proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even if the practice did not infringe on 
antitrust law, and that the Commission was empowered to proscribe practices as 
unfair or deceptive in their effect on consumers, regardless of their nature or effect 
on competition.30 The Supreme Court reasoned that because Congress explicitly 
refused to define unfair practices by tying their definitions to statute or common 
                                                          
25 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). 
26 See id. at 234. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 235. 
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law, the determination of what was an unfair practice was the proper domain of the 
FTC.31 
A. The Unfairness Statement of 1980 
Sperry & Hutchinson gave the FTC tremendous power and flexibility to 
define unfair practices.32 In 1980, the FTC issued a letter, now known as the 
“Unfairness Statement,” to the Congressional Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, which addressed the 
palpable limits of the FTC’s unfairness authority.33 In its letter, the FTC identified 
three standards to be considered in identifying an unfair practice: (1) consumer 
injury; (2) violation of public policy; and (3) unethical or unscrupulous conduct.34 
The Unfairness Statement factors were codified in an amendment to § 45(n). 
1. Consumer Injury 
Fundamentally, the FTC recognized that, consistent with the FTCA, consumer 
injury, alone, is sufficient to find a practice unfair.35 A consumer injury sufficient 
for a finding of an unfair practice must be one that is (1) substantial; (2) not 
outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefit; and (3) results in an 
injury not reasonably avoided by the customer.36 Substantial consumer injury 
typically results in monetary harm or produces unwarranted health or safety risks.37 
The second factor, weighing the injury against consumer benefits, requires a 
balancing test wherein the FTC “will not find that a practice unfairly injures 
consumers unless it is injurious in its net effects.”38 Third, injuries not reasonably 
avoided by the consumer are defined as those involving “seller behavior that 
                                                          
31 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 at 240. 
32 Id. at 244 n.5 (1972) (The Supreme Court identified the FTC’s determinative factors for 
unfairness as (1) whether the practice offends public policy (as established by the common law or 
statutes) (2) “whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes 
substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).”). 
33 Andrew Serwinal, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and 
Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 828–29 (2011). 
34 The Unfairness Statement was later appended to an FTC decision, In re Int’l Harvester Co., 
104 FTC 949, 1072 (1984), and will be cited thereto, hereafter. Unethical or unscrupulous conduct had 
never served as an independent basis for the exercise of the FTC’s unfairness authority and, as such, the 
FTC concluded that it would proceed in the future on basis of the first two categories only. See 104 FTC 
949, 1076 (1984). 
35 In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1073 (1984). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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unreasonably creates or takes advantage of an obstacle to the free exercise of 
consumer decision[-]making.”39 
2. Violation of Public Policy 
The FTC recognized that public policy considerations could be used in two 
distinct ways.40 Public policy may be employed by the FTC to “test the validity and 
strength of the evidence of consumer injury, or, less often, it may be cited for a 
dispositive legislative or judicial determination that such injury is present.”41 Given 
the relative importance of public policy in FTC unfairness determinations, the FTC 
proposed a two pronged test, both necessary to establish a violation of public 
policy.42 First, the public policy should be clearly established by and embodied, or 
declared in judicial decisions, statutes, or the Constitution, as interpreted by the 
courts.43 Second, the public policy should be widely shared, and not isolated to a 
single state or court.44 If both prongs are met, and convincing independent evidence 
of the violation is established, the FTC may conclude that the practice is “distorting 
the operation of the market and thereby causing unjustified consumer injury.”45 
Ultimately, the FTCA provides that “[i]n determining whether an act or practice is 
unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be 
considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not 
serve as a primary basis for such determination.”46 
B. “Unfair Act or Practice” Consent Order Resolutions 
Starting in 1999, the FTC sought to cede online consumer protection to 
industry self-regulation but reversed course within a year. The self-regulation 
experiment proved to be as unsuccessful as it was short-lived. By 2000, the then 
new FTC Chairman, Timothy Muris, announced a new policy that the Agency 
would no longer rely solely on self-regulation, but instead would expand 
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 In re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 FTC 949, 1074 (1984). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1076. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1049. 
46 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). For the purposes of brevity, this Article will not examine the public 
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enforcement of existing laws rather than pursue new legislation.47 As part of the 
expanded enforcement initiative, the FTC began applying the “unfairness” 
principle to organizational data security breaches.48 Owing to the ubiquitous use of 
massive data-gathering practices across a wide spectrum of American businesses 
and the nearly equally ubiquitous occurrences of data-security breaches, this 
expanded enforcement initiative had a broad regulatory impact. 
In furtherance of this expanded initiative, in May 2000, the FTC issued the 
Final Report on Online Access and Security in which the Agency indicated that 
1) security measures are a process and that no single standard can assure adequate 
security because of the evolution of security threats; 2) each website should have a 
security program that adequately protects all collected consumer information and is 
appropriate to the circumstances; and 3) appropriateness would be defined on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the risks faced by the domain, the 
costs of protection, and the type of information the site maintains.49 While this 
expanded enforcement policy was not without detractors, armed with the Final 
Report, and a new and expansive implementation program, the FTC delved into the 
data-security breach realm, heralding a new era of consumer protection and 
organizational accountability. 
1. In re BJ’s Wholesale Club 
In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. was the first time that the FTC employed its 
unfairness authority exclusively for an allegation of privacy and data security 
misrepresentation.50 BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc. (“BJ’s”) operated 150 stores in the 
United States, and maintained a membership model, allowing, generally, only BJ’s 
members to make purchases.51 BJ’s had eight million members and accepted credit 
card payments from consumers as part of its regular course of business.52 In order 
to authorize the credit card purchases, BJ’s would collect personally identifiable 
information from its customer’s credit cards, and transmit that information over its 
wireless in-store computer network to the card issuer’s bank, through BJ’s central 
                                                          
47 Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has 
the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 131 (2008). 
48 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACE: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS 42 n.21 (2000). 
49 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT ON ONLINE ACCESS 
AND SECURITY 19–25 (2000). 
50 Until this point the FTC had coupled the unfairness authority with deceptive practices to 
enforce § 45 of the FTCA. See Serwinal, supra note 33, at 840. 
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datacenter.53 BJ’s also received responses, from the banks, through the same 
transmission route.54 
In late 2003 banking institutions started noticing that customers who used 
their cards at BJ’s were subsequently victimized by fraudulent credit card 
charges.55 Consumer credit card and banking information, collected by BJ’s and 
stored on BJ’s network, were being copied by an unauthorized third party to make 
fraudulent purchases worth millions of dollars.56 As a result of the fraud, banks and 
customers were forced to cancel and reissue thousands of credit and debit cards.57 
On September 20, 2005, the FTC filed a complaint against BJ’s alleging that 
its failure to “employ reasonable and appropriate security measures to protect 
personal information and files caused or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition 
and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. This practice was an unfair act or 
practice.”58 
The FTC provided patently clear, but often ignored, reasoning in establishing 
that BJ’s conduct was an unfair consumer practice.59 The FTC alleged that a 
combination of practices, taken together, constituted unreasonable security for 
sensitive personal information: 
(1) failing to encrypt information collected in its stores 
while the information was in transit or stored on BJ’s 
computer networks; (2) storing the information in files 
that could be accessed anonymously, that is, using a 
commonly known default user id and password; 
(3) failing to use readily available security measures to 
limit access to its networks through wireless access 
points on the networks; (4) failing to employ measures 
sufficient to detect unauthorized access to the networks 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 467. 
56  Complaint at 466, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 FTC 465 (2005). 
57 Id. at 466. 
58 Id. at 468. 
59 The FTC reasoning in this instance is not only patently clear, but also provides the basis upon 
which nearly every subsequent data-security enforcement action is based. Shamefully, academics and 
organizations, alike, either ignore or fail to realize that a combination of individual missteps in data 
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or conduct security investigations; and (5) storing 
information for up to 30 days when BJ’s no longer had a 
business need to keep the information, in violation of 
bank security rules.60 
Here, BJ’s failed its consumers on a plethora of easily reconciled issues; it 
does not seem clear that any one violation would have supported the FTC’s 
complaint, but the combination of failures measured up to conduct causing 
substantial, unavoidable consumer injury. If BJ’s had remedied any one of the five 
specific allegations leveled by the FTC it should have left BJ’s more than able to 
prevent or curtail some of the resulting consumer injury. Furthermore, there is both 
rhyme and reason to the FTC’s rationale. BJ’s collected consumer information 
which it failed to mask or encrypt, and failed to protect stored information by 
allowing access to the information with generic username and password 
combinations. BJ’s stored the poorly protected information for too long, and 
provided no notification system to alert it of possible unauthorized access.61 
Perhaps in recognition of these tremendous oversights, BJ’s capitulated to the 
FTC’s claims and signed a consent order to implement appropriate and 
comprehensive information security measures, to obtain a biannual network 
security assessment, and to file reports with the FTC until 2025.62 The FTC 
subsequently submitted the consent order to Public Notice and Comment, and then 
approved it.63 
2. FTC v. LabMD, Inc. 
In 2008, the FTC issued a resolution (“the 2008 Resolution”) defining agency 
procedures to investigate consumer privacy violations.64 The 2008 Resolution 
established FTC investigatory authority 
[t]o determine whether unnamed persons, partnerships, 
corporations, or others are engaged in, or may have 
                                                          
60 In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 FTC 465, 476 (2005). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 476–77. 
63 See Announced Actions for September 23, 2005, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2005/09/announced-actions-september-23-2005. 
64 Federal Trade Commission, Resolution Directing Use of Compulsory Process in Nonpublic 
Investigation of Acts and Practices Related to Consumer Privacy and/or Data Security, File No. 
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engaged in, deceptive or unfair acts or practices related 
to consumer privacy and/or data security, including but 
not limited to the collection, acquisition, use, disclosure, 
security, storage, retention, or disposition of consumer 
information, in or affecting commerce, in violation of 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 45, as amended. Such investigation shall, in 
addition, determine whether Commission action to 
obtain redress of injury to consumers or others would be 
in the public interest.65 
In 2009, utilizing authority granted by the 2008 Resolution, the FTC began 
investigating LabMD, Inc. (“LabMD”) and other entities, upon discovering that 
personally identifiable and sensitive health information belonging to consumers, 
collected by these organizations, was publicly available on peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks.66 Unlike BJ’s however, wherein FTC complaints resulted in speedy 
consent orders, LabMD exercised resistance to the FTC’s investigation. LabMD’s 
resistance was significant because it was the first substantial contest mounted 
against the FTC’s enforcement of the unfairness authority over third-party data-
security breaches, laying the foundations for the respondent’s claims in Wyndham. 
In the LabMD case, the FTC undertook “an inquiry to determine whether 
disclosures of consumers’ sensitive personal information [were] attributable to 
failures to employ reasonable data security measures[,] in violation of Section 5(a) 
of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), or whether they violated any other statutes or 
regulations enforced by the Commission.”67 The FTC issued Civil Investigative 
Demands (“CIDs”), to various companies, pursuant to the 2008 Resolution, in 
order to obtain copies of the electronic files containing sensitive consumer 
information.68 In response, the FTC obtained a spreadsheet containing, among 
many other things, information about 9,000 LabMD customers, including names, 
social security numbers, health insurance information, and dates of birth.69 After 
consulting with law enforcement agencies, the FTC issued a voluntary access 
request to LabMD to help determine whether LabMD had violated the FTCA in 
                                                          
65 Id. 
66 FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005-WSD, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012). 
67 See id. at 2. 
68 Id. 
69 It is unclear, based on the opinion, whether this spreadsheet was received by the FTC from 
LabMD, or another entity. What is clear, however, is that this document was provided by a third-party 
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failing to use reasonable and appropriate security measures to safeguard consumer 
information.70 LabMD responded to the access request, but the FTC found the 
response unsatisfactory.71 
On December 21, 2011, the FTC issued additional CIDs to LabMD, 
demanding that, by January 13, 2012, the company consent to the following 
stipulations: LabMD representatives appear at investigational hearings with FTC 
staff; LabMD respond to a limited set of interrogatories; LabMD provide 
documents related to its data security practices not already disclosed by the 
voluntary access request; and LabMD certify compliance with the CIDs.72 
LabMD sought to limit and remove the CIDs through the administrative 
process, but the FTC denied LabMD’s administrative petitions.73 On June 25, 2012, 
the FTC contacted LabMD to implement compliance with the CIDs, but LabMD, 
again, responded with objections.74 In August 2012, after LabMD’s continued 
failure to comply with the CIDs, the FTC filed a petition in court seeking an order 
requiring LabMD’s compliance, pursuant to the FTC’s authority under 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 46, 57b-1 of the FTCA and the 2008 Resolution.75 The FTC alleged that 
LabMD’s failure to comply with the CIDs hindered the FTC’s investigation into 
possible data-security breaches at LabMD.76 
In September 2012, the court ordered that the FTC serve LabMD with its 
petition and that LabMD show cause at a hearing explaining why the CIDs should 
not be implemented.77 The court also directed LabMD to file a pleading stating its 
legal and factual support for failing to comply with the FTC’s CIDs.78 The court 
further ordered the FTC to file a supplemental pleading to answer several 
questions, including “[W]hat is the FTC required to show to meet the requirement 
that the subpoena is issued in an inquiry that is within the authority of the agency?” 
                                                          
70 LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005-WSD at 3. 
71 The opinion provides that “LabMD responded to the voluntary access request, but the FTC was 
dissatisfied with the scope of materials and information that were provided.” Id. Presumably the 
dissatisfaction stemmed from the breadth of LabMD’s disclosures, though subsequent CIDs may 
indicate what the FTC felt LabMD was holding back. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 4. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005-WSD at 3. 
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and “[h]ow does the FTC meet the [‘]within the authority of the agency standard[’] 
in this case?”79 LabMD put forward several arguments to invalidate the FTC’s 
CIDs, chief among them that the FTC’s claim of authority to regulate data security 
“is not based on any threat of substantial injury to consumers, but only 
generalities.”80 
In addressing these arguments, the court noted that in assessing the validity of 
the FTC’s CIDs, it was restricted to consider: “(1) Whether the agency makes a 
plausible argument in support of its assertion of jurisdiction, and (2) Whether the 
information sought by the CID is plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful 
purpose of the FTC.”81 The court held that the CIDs were enforceable because 
there was a plausible argument for the FTC’s statutory authority and jurisdiction 
over data security and consumer privacy, and that the information sought in the 
CIDs was reasonably relevant to its investigation of LabMD’s data-security 
practices.82 The court reasoned that the 
FTC presents a plausible argument for the exercise of its 
jurisdiction to investigate and enforce in the realm of 
data security and consumer privacy—which it has done 
so [sic] in at least forty-four instances since 2000—in 
light of the threat of substantial consumer harm that 
occurs when consumers are victims of identity theft.83 
The court further reasoned that the FTC’s argument that poor data security and 
consumer privacy both facilitate and contribute to “predictable and substantial 
harm to consumers in violation of Section [45]” was plausible, and therefore 
“material and relevant to a lawful purpose of the agency.”84 Finally, the court 
                                                          
79 Id. at 5. 
80 Id. at 11. 
81 Id. at 7 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (providing that “it is well-settled that the role 
of a district court in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is sharply limited; inquiry is 
appropriate only into whether the evidence sought is material and relevant to a lawful purpose of the 
agency.”). 
82 LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005-WSD at 13–14. 
83 Id. at 13. 
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ordered LabMD to comply with the FTC’s CIDs, and granted the FTC’s Petition.85 
The FTC’s investigation is still on going.86 
Interestingly, LabMD appears, on the surface, both to affirm the FTC’s 
authority to regulate data security and consumer privacy practices, and to confer 
legitimacy to the FTC’s investigatory pursuits. However, due to the limited scope 
of LabMD’s challenge to the FTC, via the legitimacy of the CIDs, LabMD does not 
convey much in the way of judicial guidance for the Wyndham case. LabMD is the 
first of only two organizations (the other being Wyndham) to raise a significant 
challenge to the FTC’s authority over data security practices. 
C. The FTC’s Final Privacy Report of 2012 
In March 2012, the FTC issued its final privacy report, Protecting Consumer 
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and 
Policymakers (“Final Report”).87 The Final Report urged businesses to adopt data 
security measures based on three principles. First, the report suggests privacy by 
design, meaning “Companies should incorporate substantive privacy protections 
into their practices, such as data security, reasonable collection limits, sound 
retention and disposal practices, and data accuracy,” and should maintain 
comprehensive measures to assess privacy protections throughout the data 
collection lifecycle.88 The Final Report expounded on reasonable data collection 
limits, providing: 
Companies should limit data collection to that which is 
consistent with the context of a particular transaction or 
the consumer’s relationship with the business, or as 
required or specifically authorized by law. For any data 
collection that is inconsistent with these contexts, 
companies should make appropriate disclosures to 
consumers at a relevant time and in a prominent 
manner—outside of a privacy policy or other legal 
document. This clarification of the collection limitation 
principle is intended to help companies assess whether 
                                                          
85 Id. 
86 LabMD, Inc., In the Matter of, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 4, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter. 
87 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS at iii (2000) [hereinafter FINAL PRIVACY 
REPORT]. 
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their data collection is consistent with what a consumer 
might expect; if it is not, they should provide prominent 
notice and choice.89 
Second, the Final Report suggests that companies should simplify consumer 
choice, by stating that: 
For practices requiring choice, companies should offer 
the choice at a time and in a context in which the 
consumer is making a decision about his or her data. 
Companies should obtain affirmative express consent 
before (1) using consumer data in a materially different 
manner than claimed when the data was collected; or 
(2) collecting sensitive data for certain purposes.90 
Thirdly, the Final Report urges transparency in privacy and data security 
practices.91 In addition to this guidance, the FTC also called for basic data security 
legislation, and offered to work with Congress and private organizations to develop 
appropriate statutory provisions.92 
Most importantly, the FTC asserted that it is “well settled that companies 
must provide reasonable security for consumer data. The Commission has a long 
history of enforcing data security obligations under [§ 45] of the FTC Act.”93 The 
FTC’s assertion not only affirms its fundamental belief in its statutory authority to 
investigate and prohibit unreasonable consumer data practices, but also to continue 
to do so under § 45. The latter notion underscores the importance of the Wyndham 
case. Currently, the causes of data security and consumer privacy protection have 
only one voice in the federal government, the FTC. The Wyndham court possesses, 
at least preliminarily, the power to either silence that voice, or enhance the FTC’s 
guardianship. 
                                                          
89 Id. at 27. 
90 Id. at 60. 
91 Id. at 60. 
92 Id. at viii. 
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III. FTC V. WYNDHAM 
Wyndham teeters on the precipice of the FTC’s authority to enforce 
reasonable data-security measures because to date no court decision has either 
upheld or rejected the premise that the FTC may regulate third-party data-security 
practices under § 45. In Wyndham, the arguments for and against the FTC’s 
authority to regulate data-security breaches are powerful, and the outcome will 
have overwhelming significance for the FTC, commercial entities, and consumers 
alike. 
A. The FTC’s Allegations 
On June 26, 2012, the FTC brought a two-count complaint against Wyndham 
Hotels and Resorts, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Wyndham Hotel Group, 
and Wyndham Hotel Management (collectively, “Wyndham”), and subsequently 
amended its complaint on August 8, 2012.94 The FTC alleges that Wyndham’s 
failure to employ reasonable data-security practices resulted in two violations of 
§ 45. First, the FTC asserts that Wyndham engaged in deceptive business practices 
by misrepresenting the security measures it undertook to protect consumers’ 
personal information.95 Second, the FTC asserts that “Wyndham engaged in unfair 
business practices because its failure to use reasonable methods to safeguard 
consumers’ personal information caused or is likely to cause substantial injury that 
could not be avoided by consumers and was not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits.”96 In support of the two counts, the FTC alleges that Wyndham “violated 
the FTCA in connection with their failure to employ reasonable data security 
practices, which resulted in three data security breaches in less than two years, the 
known theft of hundreds of thousands of consumers’ payment card account 
numbers, and millions of dollars in fraud loss.”97 
Wyndham, through its subsidiaries and franchises, manages hotels, sells 
timeshares, and licenses its brand name to approximately ninety independently 
owned hotels.98 For all associated Wyndham locations, Wyndham also creates and 
                                                          
94 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels and Resort’s Motion to Dismiss at 1, 
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 4766957 (D. Ariz. 
Oct. 1, 2012). 
95 This paper will not analyze or discuss the FTC’s allegation of deception against Wyndham. 
96 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels and Resort’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, 
No. 2:12-cv-01365-PHX-PGR. 
97 Id. 
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oversees information security policies.99 As part of its information security policies, 
Wyndham requires that each Wyndham branded hotel purchase a designated 
property management system to handle reservations, manage inventory, and to 
handle payment card transactions.100 The designated property management systems 
store consumer information, including names, addresses, email addresses, 
telephone numbers, payment card account numbers, expiration dates and card 
security codes.101 Each property management system is part of Wyndham’s 
computer network, and is linked to Wyndham’s central corporate network, much of 
which in turn, is housed in a Phoenix data center.102 Wyndham’s computer network 
is managed solely by Wyndham, and Wyndham alone sets all program rules and 
password requirements granting employee access to the management system.103 
Wyndham franchisee and brand name owners pay Wyndham to support the 
property management systems, and, in turn, Wyndham employs a technical support 
team responsible for managing all technical issues.104 
The FTC alleges that between April 2008 and January 2010, on three separate 
occasions, third party intruders gained unauthorized access to Wyndham’s 
computer network and property management systems.105 The first intrusion 
occurred in April 2008 when intruders executed a brute force attack on a Wyndham 
administrator account.106 The brute force attack was eventually successful and with 
admittance to the administrator account, the intruders were granted unfettered 
access to the property management system servers for a number of hotels.107 The 
compromised property management servers, which were using discontinued 
security protocols, did not employ any security mechanisms to prevent access to 
other connected network servers.108 The intruders then installed memory-scraping 
malware on the property management systems, which collected payment card 





103 Wyndham First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 A brute force attack is achieved through guessing multiple use IDs and passwords. Brute force 
attacks generally trigger account lockouts, which did occur in this instance. Multiple account lockouts 
typically serve as an indication of an attempted third-party network compromise. Here, Wyndham, 
because of security failures discussed below, did not discover the breach until four months later. See id. 
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information, associated with payment authorization transactions.109 The FTC 
alleges that this first security breach resulted in the compromise of over 500,000 
payment card accounts.110 
The second breach occurred in March 2009, approximately six months after 
Wyndham had discovered the first breach.111 In this instance, the intruders gained 
unauthorized access to the Wyndham network through a service provider’s 
administrator account in the Phoenix data center.112 In May 2009, Wyndham 
consumers complained about fraudulent payment charges after using their payment 
cards for visits to Wyndham properties.113 Wyndham then searched their networks 
for memory-scraping malware, and found malignant programs on over thirty 
property management systems in their network.114 The intruders also reconfigured 
the software to create clear text files containing the payment and personal 
information of guests using payment cards at the hotels.115 In this second incident, 
the intruders were able to access, collect, and use the payment and personal 
information of more than Wyndham 50,000 consumers.116 
In late 2009, for the third time, intruders compromised an administrator 
account on Wyndham’s network.117 Somewhat incredibly, despite the first two 
breaches, Wyndham still had not successfully limited access on its network. 
Employing the same technique as before, the intruders were able to access multiple 
Wyndham property management systems and, similarly, installed memory-scraping 
malware to access payment card account information on Wyndham’s network.118 
As in the second breach, Wyndham discovered the intrusion second-hand.119 In 
January 2010, a credit-card issuer notified Wyndham of fraudulent activity using 
payment cards that were compromised shortly after use at Wyndham properties.120 
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Twenty-eight property management systems were compromised, and intruders 
were able to access, collect, and use the payment and personal information of more 
than 69,000 Wyndham consumers.121 
The FTC alleges that Wyndham’s failure to “implement reasonable and 
appropriate security measures exposed consumers’ personal information to 
unauthorized access, collection, and use. Such exposure . . . has caused and is likely 
to cause substantial consumer injury, including financial injury, to consumers and 
businesses.”122 In totality, the breaches resulted in more than $10.6 million in fraud 
loss.123 Both businesses and consumers suffered injury including, but not limited to, 
“unreimbursed fraudulent charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or 
credit. Consumers and businesses also expended time and money resolving 
fraudulent charges and mitigating subsequent harm.”124 
As in all the adjudications mentioned above,125 the FTC noted that no one 
single practice resulted in culpability. Rather, a combination of practices employed 
by Wyndham, taken together, constituted a failure to “employ reasonable and 
appropriate measures to protect personal information against unauthorized access,” 
and therefore unfair acts or practices in violation of § 45.126 In particular, the FTC 
alleges that Wyndham: 
a. [F]ailed to use readily available security measures 
to limit access between . . . property management 
systems, the . . . corporate network, and the 
Internet, such as by employing firewalls; 
b. [A]llowed software at the Wyndham-branded 
hotels to be configured inappropriately, resulting 
in the storage of payment card information in clear 
readable text; 
c. [F]ailed to ensure the Wyndham-branded hotels 
implemented adequate information security 
policies and procedures prior to connecting their 
local computer networks to Hotels and Resorts’ 
computer network; 
                                                          
121 Id. 
122 Wyndham First Amended Complaint, supra note 1. 
123 Id. at 8. 
124 Id. 
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d. [F]ailed to remedy known security vulnerabilities 
on Wyndham-branded hotels’ servers that were 
connected to Hotels and Resorts’ computer 
network, thereby putting personal information held 
by [Wyndham] and the other Wyndham-branded 
hotels at risk . . . ; 
e. [A]llowed servers to connect to Hotels and 
Resorts’ network, despite the fact that well-known 
default user IDs and passwords were enabled on 
the servers, which were easily available to hackers 
through simple Internet searches; 
f. [F]ailed to employ commonly-used methods to 
require user IDs and passwords that are difficult 
for hackers to guess . . . ; 
g. [F]ailed to adequately inventory computers 
connected to the Hotels and Resorts’ network so 
that [Wyndham] could appropriately manage the 
devices on its network; 
h. [F]ailed to employ reasonable measures to detect 
and prevent unauthorized access to [Wyndham’s] 
computer network or to conduct security 
investigations; 
i. [F]ailed to follow proper incident response 
procedures, including failing to monitor . . . 
computer network for malware used in a previous 
intrusion; and 
j. [F]ailed to adequately restrict third-party vendors’ 
access to [the] network and the Wyndham-branded 
hotels’ property management systems . . . .127 
The FTC’s allegations against Wyndham are almost precisely the same 
combination of practices, taken together, which the FTC leveled against BJ’s and 
LabMD.128 Specifically, we see a failure to mask or encrypt consumer 
information,129 to limit access to the information by using generic user ID and 
passwords,130 and to provide a notification system to alert Wyndham of 
                                                          
127 Id. at 5. 
128 See infra Part III.B.1–2 (discussing the BJ’s and LabMD adjudications). 
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unauthorized access.131 The failure to limit access to consumer information through 
inter-network connections is very much in line with the theme of limiting access to 
consumer information through the use of non-generic ID and password 
combinations because both issues concern basic systems of access limitation 
concepts, which should be part of the most basic systems of network security.132 A 
disturbingly novel addition to unreasonable practices in the Wyndham case is the 
company’s abject failure to mitigate known vulnerabilities.133 
B. Wyndham’s Motion to Dismiss 
After the FTC filed its complaint, Wyndham, on August 27, 2012, filed a 
motion to dismiss. In the motion to dismiss, Wyndham argues that “simply put, 
[§ f4’s] prohibition on ‘unfair’ trade practices does not give the FTC authority to 
regulate the data-security practices of private companies.”134 Wyndham posits the 
position that (1) the FTC lacks authority to pursue unfair practices related to data-
security, (2) the unfairness actions related to data security require rulemaking, and 
(3) the injury resulting from these payment card breaches is insufficient to support 
a claim. 
First Wyndham argues that the FTC’s unfairness authority does not extend to 
data security because “nothing in the plain text of Section [45] suggests that 
Congress gave the FTC authority to regulate data security, which is itself strong 
evidence that no such authority exists.”135 Specifically, Wyndham argues that the 
existence of specific statutory authorizations granting the FTC authority to regulate 
data-security practices preclude an interpretation of § 45 that would grant the FTC 
jurisdiction to regulate data-security practices outside of those specific 
                                                          
131 Id. ¶ dc, g, f, at 10–12. 
132 Advice regarding the use of non-generic passwords, and employing firewalls to protect even 
personal computers is so ubiquitous that it would be imprudent to call such measures anything other 
than commonly held knowledge. For example, nearly all network servers employ password 
configuration operations and firewalls explicitly to prevent unauthorized third-party access. See Wes 
Noonan & Ido Dubrawsky, Chapter 11: Managing Firewalls, NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 27, 2007, 2:22 
PM), http://www.networkworld.com/subnets/cisco/112707-ch11-managing-firewalls.html. 
133 This new allegation raises the idea of negligence, and possibly recklessness on the part of 
organizations who fail to remedy known data-security vulnerabilities. Though negligence and 
recklessness are not elements of an unfair practice under § 45, negligence and recklessness do play a 
role in limited instances of calculating the nature of consumer injury. See, e.g., Motion to Dismiss by 
Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts LLC at 7, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-
1365-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 3916987 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27, 2012) (arguing that under state unfair practice 
statutes a practice is unfair only when “egregious or ‘reckless’ in nature.”) [hereinafter Wyndham’s 
Motion to Dismiss]. 
134 Id. at 3. 
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delegations.136 Wyndham notes that the FTC’s action here is analogous to the 
FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products that was the focus of FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson.137 
In Brown & Williamson, tobacco manufacturers, advertisers and retailers 
brought an action against the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) in response to 
the FDA’s attempted regulation over tobacco products under The Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).138 Owing to the structure of the FDCA, and to the fact 
that the “fundamental precept of the FDCA is that any product regulated by the 
FDA that remains on the market must be safe and effective for its intended use,”139 
the FDA’s proposed regulation over tobacco would statutorily mandate the ban of 
tobacco products.140 In evaluating the FDA’s statutory authority, the Court looked 
to whether Congress had “directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If so, the 
court must give effect to Congress’ unambiguously expressed intent.”141 The Court 
held that because Congress had enacted regulation dealing specifically with 
tobacco products, Congress thereby “foreclosed the removal of tobacco products 
from the market.”142 The Court reasoned that: 
Congress’ decisions to regulate labeling and advertising 
and to adopt the express policy of protecting “commerce 
and the national economy . . . to the maximum extent” 
reveal its intent that tobacco products remain on the 
market. Indeed, the collective premise of these statutes is 
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco will continue to be 
sold in the United States. A ban of tobacco products by 
the FDA would therefore plainly contradict 
congressional policy.143 
                                                          
136 Id. at 4–5 (referencing The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), The Gramm-Leach-Biley Act 
(“GLBA”), The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), The Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996, The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
Act, and The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act (“CTCPC”).). 
137 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 (2000). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 121. 
140 Id. at 137. 
141 Id. at 121 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
142 Id. at 137. 
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The Supreme Court rejected the FDA’s position because Congress had 
subsequently enacted tobacco-specific legislation.144 Similar to the reasoning in 
Brown, Wyndham argues that the establishment of substantive data-security 
standards for private companies has been a contested topic in Congress. Wyndham 
suggests that the proposal, and failure, of eight data-security bills deem the notion 
of Congress delegating such an authority to the FTC offensive to common sense.145 
Second, Wyndham argues that even assuming the FTC was authorized to 
regulate data security, any regulations require establishment through administrative 
rulemaking.146 Wyndham suggests that the FTC has mandated data-security 
standards, ex post, through selective enforcement actions, and that any imposition 
of such standards on Wyndham would raise “serious constitutional questions of fair 
notice and due process.”147 
Third, Wyndham argues that even if § 45 could be construed to grant the 
FTC’s authority over data-security practices, the nature of the consumer injury 
raised in Wyndham is unique, and therefore not subject to protection by the FTC.148 
Wyndham argues that the injury of payment card account theft is always avoidable 
and never substantial because “[f]ederal law places a $50 limit on the amount for 
which a consumer can be liable for the unauthorized use of a payment card. And all 
major card brands . . . waive liability for that small amount.”149 
C. The FTC’s Response 
On October 1, 2012, the FTC filed a response in opposition to Wyndham’s 
motion to dismiss.150 Taking an opportunity to respond to Wyndham’s claims, the 
FTC asserts that the FTC has authority to enforce the FTCA against entities for 
unfair practices related to data-security based on § 45(n), and the FTC is not 
required to address data security through rulemaking because the unfairness 
                                                          
144 Id. 
145 Wyndham’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 133. 
146 Id. at 5–6. 
147 Id. at 6. 
148 Id. at 7. 
149 Id. 
150 Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels and Resorts’ Motion to Dismiss, FTC 
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR, 2012 WL 4766957 (D. Ariz. Oct. 1, 2012) 
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authority is well established, and case by case adjudication is a discretionary power 
granted to all administrative agencies.151 
In support of its position the FTC advances several points. First, the FTC 
argues that § 45 prohibits unfair acts or practices in, or affecting, commerce and 
that the sector-specific exclusions do not apply to Wyndham.152 The FTC suggests 
that Congress purposefully delegated broad power to the FTC, in order to address 
unanticipated unfair practices, and that, as suggested in Sperry & Hutchinson, 
defining an unfair act or practice is the explicit purview of the FTC.153 Further, the 
FTC suggests that the authority to regulate an unfair act or practice are limited to 
those consumer injuries that are substantial, not reasonably avoided by the 
consumer, and which are not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition.154 
Next the FTC suggests that enumerated data security statutes do not preclude 
or foreclose the FTC from authority over data security because none of the statutes 
expressly, or impliedly, restrict the FTC’s unfairness authority over data 
security.155 Rather, the FTC alleges that the statutes “enhance the FTC’s legal tools 
beyond the FTC Act by giving the FTC either civil penalty or rulemaking authority 
in specific circumstances.”156 In response to Wyndham’s reliance of Brown & 
Williamson, the FTC distinguishes its authority over data security from the FDA’s 
authority over tobacco, arguing that in Brown & Williamson, the FDA’s 
“subsequent assertion of authority regarding tobacco ‘would require the agency to 
ban’ tobacco products under the FDCA, a result that would have mooted the 
congressionally-authorized regulatory regime.”157 
The Court’s reasoning in Brown & Williamson is at the epicenter of both 
Wyndham’s and the FTC’s interpretation of the unfairness authority, in light of 
subsequent data-security specific legislation enacted by Congress. Wyndham has 
suggested that the existence of data-security specific legislation, enacted 
subsequent to § 45’s unfairness authority, preclude the FTC regulation in the data 
                                                          
151 Id. at 12. 
152 Id. at 5–6. 
153 Id. at 3. 
154 Id. at 6. 
155 Id. at 8–9. 
156 The FTC’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 150, at 8. 
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security realm.158 Characterized as such, Wyndham’s argument appears well 
grounded. However, the Court’s reasoning in Brown & Williamson explicitly 
imparts that congressional intent is of paramount importance.159 On deeper 
consideration, because the attempted FDA regulation over tobacco products, and 
requisite product removal, stood in stark contrast to congressional intent to keep 
tobacco products on the market, the Court found Congress precluded FDA’s 
authority.160 Congressional intent to keep tobacco on the market was embodied in 
legislation enacted subsequent to the FDCA, which would have precluded any 
tobacco product ban.161 Thus, it appears that subsequent statutes, which more 
specifically address the topic at hand, are not preclusive, as Wyndham suggests, 
unless that subsequent statute embodies congressional intent precluding an 
Agency’s statutory enforcement construction. The FTC advances this position by 
asserting that because Congress has enacted no inconsistent or irreconcilable 
legislation against the FTC’s authority over data-security, that the FTC’s 
interpretation of § 45 to regulate unfair data security practices is properly 
founded.162 
The FTC also argues that it is authorized to announce new principles through 
adjudication, and further, that the principle at force in the Wyndham complaint is 
not a new principle at all. The FTC asserts that the action against Wyndham is 
“simply a standard application of this authority against an entity that failed to 
undertake reasonable measures to protect information that it collected about 
consumers.”163 Furthermore, the FTC defends its enforcement history by noting 
that the decision to enforce § 45 on a case-by-case is a discretionary power granted 
administrative agencies. In particular, the FTC notes that it would be impossible “to 
set forth the type of particularized guidelines that Wyndham suggests would be 
appropriate for rulemaking,” owing to continually developing industry standards.164 
Further, the FTC notes that its reasonableness inquiry is perfectly suited to the 
ever-evolving landscape of data types and security vulnerabilities—a standard 
which courts are equipped to navigate.165 Additionally, the FTC emphasizes that it 
                                                          
158 Wyndham’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 133. 
159 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 120 (2000). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
162 The FTC’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 150, at 8. 
163 Id. at 12. 
164 Id. 
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has been “investigating, testifying about, and providing public guidance on 
companies’ data security obligations under the [FTCA] for more than a decade, and 
so is not moving in a new direction through the instant action.”166 
Finally, the FTC argues that consumers suffered a substantial injury as a 
result of Wyndham’s data-security practices (or lack thereof). The FTC argues that 
the injury suffered by Wyndham consumers is exactly the type of injury the FTC is 
tasked to remedy—small harms to large numbers of consumers.167 The FTC further 
posits that, whether or not the injury is reimbursed is not a consideration for 
whether an injury is avoidable, and that even if reimbursed, the injury is not fully 
mitigated.168 As to Wyndham’s argument that the standard of liability for failing to 
adequately protect consumer data should correspond to the small risk of injury 
posed by the theft of consumer information, the FTC argues that “the only 
balancing contemplated by the FTCA is weighing the benefit to consumers of 
inferior information security against the injury to consumers of the resulting 
potential exposure of their information.”169 
D. Wyndham’s Motion to Dismiss Denied 
On April 7, 2014, the court issued an opinion denying Wyndham’s motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).170 In rejecting the 
arguments raised by Wyndham’s motion, the court found: (1) Wyndham’s 
challenge to the FTC’s authority to assert an unfairness claim in the data-security is 
not preempted by the Brown & Williamson precedent because, in this instance, the 
circumstances differ;171 (2) even absent formally promulgated regulations, the FTC 
does not violate fair notice principles because precedent provides that “agencies 
like the FTC need not formally issue regulations,”172 and; (3) the FTC’s allegations 
were sufficiently pled to support the unfairness and deception claims, and to 
survive a motion to dismiss.173 The court denied the motion on all counts, finding 
that Wyndham’s “motion to dismiss demands that this court carve out a data 
security exception to the FTC’s authority and that the FTC publish regulations 
                                                          
166 Id. 
167 The FTC’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 150. 
168 Id. at 14. 
169 Id. at 7. 
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before filing an unfairness claim in federal court. These demands are, in fact, what 
bring us to uncharted territory.”174 
1. FTC’s Authority to Assert Unfairness Claim Not Preempted by 
Brown & Williamson 
First, the court rejected Wyndham’s invitation to carve out a data-security 
exception to the FTC’s unfairness authority based on Brown & Williamson, 
because Wyndham failed to explain how the FTC’s unfairness authority “would 
lead to a result that is incompatible with more recent legislation and thus would 
plainly contradict congressional policy.”175 Importantly, the court noted that 
subsequent data-security legislation is not at odds with the FTC’s unfairness 
authority, but rather, complementary.176 The court reasoned that because 
subsequent statutes like the FCRA, GLBA and COPPA set forth different standards 
for consumer injury based on specified circumstances, these statutes provide the 
FTC with additional enforcement tools.177 
2. FTC Authorized to Bring Unfairness Claims Absent Formal Rules 
The court considered whether the FTC must promulgate rules and regulations 
to satisfy fair notice requirements.178 The court rejected Wyndham’s argument that 
the FTC cannot bring an enforcement action under the unfairness authority without 
first formally publishing rules and regulations.179 The court held that fair notice of 
forbidden or required conduct does not require the FTC to formally issue rules and 
regulations before it can file an unfairness claim.180 Section 45 proscriptions are 
flexible and “to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field 
of business . . . Accordingly, Circuit Courts of appeal have affirmed FTC 
unfairness actions in a variety of contexts without preexisting rules or regulations 
                                                          
174 Id. at 4. 
175 Id. at 6 (internal quotations and citations removed); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 139 (2000). 
176 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887(ES), 2014 WL 1349019, at *7 (D.N.J. Apr. 
7, 2014). See also discussion supra Part III.C. 
177 Id. at 7. The court also rejected arguments pertaining to alleged representations by the FTC 
disclaiming authority over data discussion. See id. at 7–9 (providing that “the public record here is 
unlike the lengthy, forceful history of [the FDA’s] repeated and consistent disavowals in Brown & 
Williamson.”). 
178 See discussion supra Part III.B–C. 
179 Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887(ES), 2014 WL 1349019, at *12–13. 
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specifically addressing the conduct-at-issue.”181 The court concluded that especially 
given the rapidly-evolving nature of data security, Wyndham’s argument is 
untenable because “the consequence of accepting [Wyndham’s] proposal: the FTC 
would have to cease bringing all unfairness actions without first proscribing 
particularized prohibitions—a result that is in direct contradiction with the 
flexibility necessarily inherent in [§ i45] of the [FTCA].”182 
3. FTC Sufficiently Pled Substantial, Unavoidable Consumer Injury 
Next, the court considered whether the FTC alleged substantial, unavoidable 
consumer injury and otherwise satisfied federal pleading requirements.183 Here 
again, the court rejected Wyndham’s argument, and held that under the Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), the FTC sufficiently pled an unfairness claim under 
the FTCA.184 In deciding this issue, the court emphasized its standard of review on 
the motion to dismiss, and provided that “all allegations in the complaint must be 
taken as true, and the plaintiff must be given the benefit of every favorable 
inference to be drawn therefrom.”185 Comporting with this standard, the court 
reasoned that the FTC sufficiently pled that Wyndham’s data security practices 
were unfair.186 The FTC showed that Wyndham caused substantial injury to 
consumers, which were not reasonably avoidable by the consumers themselves, and 
which were not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition.187 The court found that the FTC adequately pled a substantial injury to 
consumers because the FTC allegations, taken as true, included unreimbursed 
financial injury. In concluding, the court held that the FTC’s allegations of 
Wyndham’s unreasonable data security practices supported reasonable inferences 
                                                          
181 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
182 Id. at 15. Interestingly, the court seems to infer that fair notice of reasonable and appropriate 
data-security measures may be drawn from the numerous public complaints, consent agreements, and 
public statements issued by the FTC, and further implies that those same promulgations could provide 
guidance for courts and litigators as to determining whether data security measures are reasonable and 
appropriate in specific circumstances. Id. at 14–15. 
183 Id. 
184 Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887(ES), 2014 WL 1349019, at 16. 
185 Id. at 3. 
186 See id. at 16. 
187 This analysis focuses on two of Wyndham’s issues in challenging the FTC’s allegations: (1) 
that the FTC insufficiently pled that Wyndham’s conduct caused or was likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers and; (2) that the FTC insufficiently pled that the consumer injuries were not 
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in the FTC’s favor that “[Wyndham’s] data[]security practices caused theft of 
personal data, which ultimately caused substantial injury to customers.”188 
Finally, the court summarily refused to accept Wyndham’s claim that the 
alleged consumer injuries were reasonably avoidable.189 The court reasoned that 
Wyndham “effectively asks the Court to hold that, as a matter of law, any financial 
injury from payment card theft data is reasonably avoidable and that the FTC’s 
allegation to the contrary, could not be true under any factual scenario.”190 The 
court held that they could not “make such a far-reaching conclusion regarding an 
issue that seems fact-dependent.” 
E. Looking to Trial 
Bearing in mind that the court’s opinion was subject to the standards of 
review for a motion to dismiss, several important implications may be drawn from 
the court f opinion. It is likely that, given the court’s emphasis on the standard of 
review for a motion to dismiss, the most important determinations for the court at 
trial will involve a factual determination of whether the FTC can prove that 
Wyndham’s practices caused substantial injury, not reasonably avoidable by the 
consumer. Most telling of this notion is the court’s attempt to downplay the gravity 
of its decision to dismiss, and perhaps to assuage industry concern, explicitly 
noting that: 
To be sure the Court does not render a decision on 
liability. Instead, it resolves a motion to dismiss a 
complaint. And this decision does not give the FTC a 
blank check to sustain a lawsuit against every business 
that has been hacked. Instead the court denies a motion 
to dismiss given the allegations in this complaint—
which must be taken as true at this stage in view of 
binding and persuasive precedent.191 
On the surface, the court assures a narrow holding and almost hesitantly 
permits the suit to proceed based on the specific allegations in the Wyndham 
complaint, justified only by precedent and the federal standard of review on a 
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motion to dismiss. Significantly, the court emphasizes that the decision would not 
issue the FTC a blank check to sustain lawsuits against any business impacted by 
third-party breaches, limited only by a forceful disclaimer that “the court denies a 
motion to dismiss given the allegations in this complaint—which must be taken as 
true at this stage.”192 While the court’s opinion is not necessarily dispositive of 
what may proceed at trial, it seems apparent that the court believes both that the 
FTC’s unfairness authority encompasses the enforcement of reasonable and 
appropriate data security, and that the FTC need not formally promulgate rules and 
regulations to bring an unfairness claim in federal court.193 
The court’s treatment of the third issue, whether the FTC’s allegations 
sufficiently supported a claim of substantial, unavoidable consumer injury, is 
particularly noteworthy. Even though Wyndham argued that no injury-in-fact 
resulted from the breaches, the court accepted the FTC’s allegations, stating that 
“for the purposes of resolving [Wyndham’s] motion, the[] allegations must be 
accepted as true.”194 Amazingly, in a footnote to that discussion, the court provided 
[t]he parties contest whether non-monetary injuries are 
cognizable under [§ 45 of the FTCA]. Although the 
Court is not convinced that non-monetary harm, is as a 
matter of law, unsustainable under [§ 45 of the FTCA], 
the Court need not reach this issue given the analysis of 
the substantial harm element above.195 
The notion that non-monetary harm may be cognizable under an unfairness claim, 
is itself a profound implication, and one that could significantly expand the scope 
of the FTC’s unfairness authority. Further, because the court adopted the FTC’s 
allegations as true and thereby was able to reasonably infer that a substantial 
consumer injury had occurred, the issue of whether a non-monetary harm is a 
sustainable injury under § 45 may, indeed, be left to open court. At the very least, 
although the court need not have reached the issue on a motion to dismiss, the 
court’s dicta infers that the issue may well arise at trial—and that, for now, the 
Federal District Court of New Jersey may consider non-monetary harm as a 
sustainable consumer injury under § 45. 
                                                          
192 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
193 Id. at 1. 
194 Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 13-1887(ES), 2014 WL 1349019, at 16. 
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The outcome, of course, remains to be seen and predictions are, at present, 
premature. In the interim, this article has aimed to provide (1) an understanding of 
the history of the FTC’s unfairness authority; (2) an examination of important 
examples of the FTC’s enforcement of the unfairness authority through consent 
orders, in order to provide the factors, and data security measures that the FTC 
considers reasonable and appropriate for collecting personally identifiable 
consumer information; (3) a discussion of arguments challenging the FTC’s 
unfairness authority posited in Wyndham, and an evaluation their strengths; and (4) 
most fundamentally, to dispel inapposite and rudimentary characterizations of the 
FTC’s unfairness authority enforcement as irrational, inconsistent or illegitimate. 
The central significance Wyndham was summed earlier in this piece as a 
question: after a business has electronically collected and stored personal 
information, how far must it go to protect it? The answer: cash is king. 
